

Despite Détente, Soviet Spying Is on the Increase Around the World

It is not only military secrets that Communists steal now. They are after trade and technical data, too. Growing contacts in the West make their job easier.

In détente, as in cold war, the spy business is booming.

Communist agents around the world are busily stealing secrets. They are still after classified military information, but in recent years their list of targets has been expanded. Now they are going harder than ever after scientific, technical, business and trade information.

As their interests have grown, so has the number of spies. Détente has opened the way for infiltration by more and more Communist agents.

Following, in reports from many nations, is the story of how spies work—and why concern about espionage is growing in the non-Communist world.

WASHINGTON

In the United States, the Soviet Union and its Communist allies have increased both the size and the scope of their intelligence efforts.

Military secrets still are targets of high priority, as they were in the days when Soviet spies stole blueprints of the U.S. atomic bomb. But now the Communists realize how valuable inside economic and industrial information can be. Advanced American techniques are being stolen to help Communist-run industries as well as war machines.

The Soviet spy today is most likely to have a diplomatic cover. But he may be a scientist, a factory manager or a member of a visiting trade delegation. He may even be an American.

Counterintelligence experts say the Soviets not only are flooding this country with agents but also are stepping up their efforts to subvert U.S. citizens and turn them into spies.

Recent convictions of three Americans as spies for Russia indicate the campaign is working all too well.

Experts say the latest Soviet target is Washington's Capitol Hill, where vast amounts of classified information are held by congressional committees and


members of their staffs. So far, however, no one serving in or working for Congress has been caught spying.

Détente has made the work of Communist spies easier and made it harder to catch them.

Clarence M. Kelley, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, recently described the situation: "The size of the Communist-bloc diplomatic, business and cultural presence in this nation has expanded dramatically in recent years. In the last four years, the number of Communist-bloc officials alone has



Edwin G. Moore II, a former CIA employee, tried to sell secret papers to Russia.



Russian Embassy in Washington lends cover for spies posing as diplomats. So does the U.N.

increased 50 per cent. The number of bloc visitors, including those participating in commercial, cultural and educational exchanges, has more than doubled since 1972.

"Such an increased presence obviously means increased potential for intelligence operations."

Prior to 1972, Russians in the U.S. were confined primarily to Washington, New York, Chicago and San Francisco, and the FBI could concentrate its surveillance in those areas. But now, with travel restrictions eased and sailors from Communist nations taking shore leave at inland ports, the FBI has to cover almost the entire U.S.

To deal with the problem, the FBI has expanded its counterintelligence activities and staff and intensified its training programs.

Some experts charge that recent curbs on surveillance by the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have crippled American spy hunters. But others, actively engaged in the work, say they haven't been seriously handicapped so far by the restrictions.

One spy case that attracted national attention was that of two young Californians convicted in April and May of selling important defense secrets to the Kremlin. Their personal backgrounds were particularly disturbing to officials.

One of them, Christopher J. Boyce, is the son of a former FBI agent who became director of security for an airplane manufacturer. The other, Andrew D. Lee, is the son of an affluent doctor.

In another case, Edwin G. Moore II, a former CIA employee, was convicted on May 5 of trying to sell important Government documents to the Russians.

Moore, a Canadian and a West Ger-

man were arrested in Florida and charged with acting on behalf of a foreign government without registering as agents. FBI officers said the pair attempted to obtain components and materials of the U.S. cruise missile for the Soviet Union.

Such cases point up a warning by FBI chief Kelley about how Communists try to recruit Americans as spies. He said: "Every American business person, student or scientist traveling to a Communist nation is carefully screened and observed. . . . And, of course, those whose work involves any sensitive or particularly valuable information are special targets of surveillance. . . .

"Each American is observed for any kind of behavior which might be considered compromising—which might provide a basis for exploitation. If no such behavior is forthcoming, then entrapment is a common resort."

PARIS

France has had reason for tightening its guard against spying.

In March, the French secret service broke up a network of four Frenchmen and one Italian who allegedly had been passing information to the Soviet Union for 14 years. Four of the suspects had



Christopher J. Boyce, son of a former FBI agent, sold American secrets to Soviets.



Günter Guillaume and his wife spied for East Germany while he was serving as an aide to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who resigned as the result of their arrest.

done research on electronics, ballistics, computers, the North American Treaty Organization's early-warning system, and aeronautic and military projects. The other acted as a "letter box." They had a sophisticated system of receivers, transmitters, microfilming equipment, codes, invisible ink and mail drops to pass along to Russians the information that they dug up.

In February, Vladimir Ivanovitch Rybatchenko, who for four years had been the Soviet attaché to the scientific section of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, was expelled. He had been trapped by a French agent posing as an engineer handing over details of a computer system used by the French military forces.

Government officials now are investigating evidence of manipulation by Soviet agents of "Soldiers' Committees" in the French Army.

Favorite "roosts" for spies are in their embassies or other official offices and in international organizations.

Last year the leftist daily newspaper *Liberation* printed the names of 44 persons it claimed were American CIA agents working in Paris, mostly under cover of the U.S. Embassy.

BONN

West Germany for decades has been the spy capital of Europe. And officials say Communist espionage has been increasing over the past three years.

As in the U.S., agents in Germany are showing a growing interest in economic and industrial information. But valuable military and political information is still sought.

Two Germans with jobs in the office of the Chancellor—Bonn's equivalent of the American White House—have been arrested as spies.

The most recent was Dagmar Kahlig-Scheffler, a secretary in the office of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Arrested on May 5, she awaits trial on charges of spying for Communist East Germany.

Three years earlier, Günter Guillaume, a personal aide to former Chancellor Willy Brandt, was arrested on similar charges. He was later sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment and his wife to eight years. Guillaume's exposure led to Brandt's resignation.

In May of this year, four people were arrested in Düsseldorf and Frankfurt on suspicion of being East German agents. Unconfirmed reports suggest they were members of the same ring that included the Chancellery secretary.

Such actions uncover only the tip of a very large iceberg. Government officials estimate there are as many as 15,000 active Communist spies or informants in West Germany. Between 1970 and 1976, Bonn's counterintelligence agents investigated 13,527 espionage cases—88.7 per cent of them directed from East Germany or the Soviet Union.

While national-security information is involved in many cases, about half of them are concerned with stealing industrial secrets. West Germany is a prime target because that nation is a world leader in scientific research and industrial technology. West Germany is more exposed than most countries to Communist spying because it borders Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and because East and West Germans speak the same language.

In addition, West Germany harbors large numbers of people who fled or were forced out of Eastern European areas now under Communist rule. Heavy pressure can be brought on these people, especially those with relatives still behind the Iron Curtain.

More than 300 cases of spying are

proven every year in West Germany. Last year, according to the usually well-informed magazine *Quick*, 455 cases were uncovered.

GENEVA

The Swiss were badly shaken last June when a high-ranking military leader, Brig. Gen. Jean-Louis Jeanmaire, confessed to having passed top defense secrets to Moscow agents.

The General had been known as an outspoken anti-Communist and a friend of the United States. But he admitted that for 14 years he had maintained contact with members of the Russian military intelligence, informed them about Switzerland's national-defense plans, and also had passed on some of his country's secret documents.

In June, another Swiss citizen was accused of providing a "letter drop" for two Soviet agents who used their status as members of the United Nations staff in Geneva as cover for their spying. A Rumanian diplomat was also accused of spying and expelled.

The record shows Switzerland uncovered a total of 162 espionage cases between 1948 and 1976, involving 269 persons. Among them were 88 Swiss citizens and 84 diplomats or officials working for international organizations based here.

In 2 out of 3 cases, the spying was being done for Russia or other Communist nations.

Experts say all the evidence suggests that spying in Switzerland has been on the rise for several years, with the fastest expansion in industrial and political espionage. Now the Swiss are expanding their counterintelligence operations to meet the threat.

LONDON

Six years ago, the British Government expelled more than 100 Russian diplomats on charges of espionage. Now there are fewer than 100 Soviet diplomats accredited here. However, official Moscow representation in London is four times that great. Included are trade experts, journalists and members of international organizations. And there is no doubt that many of them are spies.

The role of the journalist in Communist espionage was demonstrated earlier this year when a Czechoslovak reporter stationed in Bonn defected to Britain with voluminous information about the activities of Prague's agents.

British officials also worry about activities of Soviet "industrial inspectors." There are about 70 who spend a lot of time in British factories ostensibly being trained to use equipment being bought by Russia.

Britain is trying hard to live down its

reputation of two decades ago when it was regarded as perhaps the leakiest sieve of secrets in the West.

But the task of watching thousands of actual or potential agents from the Communist world makes the security job a staggering one. It is calculated that the full-time services of 18 people are needed to maintain an effective watch on any one suspect.

The nation recently was warned by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, a former Prime Minister who was Foreign Secretary when the Russian diplomats were expelled in 1971. He said: "I have no doubt that, détente or not, the Russians and East Europeans will go on with intelligence operations here. We must not relax our guard. The leopard does not change his spots."

ROME

In Southern Europe, intelligence experts say the over-all number of spies has not gone up in recent years—but the scope of their interests has been broadened substantially.

"The days have passed when political and military intelligence was all that was asked for," says an official in one West European embassy. "Now our field covers science and industry, trade, banking, courts and prisons, students, women's libbers, drugs—you name it."

Much of the intelligence gathering is done by "up front" men, a term used to describe known members of embassy staffs with little more cover than ambiguous titles. They spend hours poring through newspapers, magazines, trade journals, bank statistics and other published information.

As one put it: "Overt intelligence is the heart of this business today. A man

who knows what to look for can come up with all sorts of revealing and significant intelligence to help the policy makers back home. As often as not, our covert [undercover] people are used to supplement, to fill in details, to confirm through secret means what we have hit upon with open information."

Yet traditional spying continues. It is no secret that the U.S. spends considerable effort safeguarding its Sixth Fleet operations in the Mediterranean, its air bases and activities of the Atlantic Alliance's southern-flank headquarters in Naples from enemy eyes.

TOKYO

Spies find Japan an easy target for year-round hunting. Among the reasons:

- Every attempt to revive the anti-espionage laws that were abolished by the U.S. occupation authorities after World War II has been blocked by strong public opposition.

- Freedom of expression has been protected so carefully that public officials are easily induced to leak important policy secrets.

- Japan has no nuclear weapons and maintains only a small defense force, which means most people believe there are no secrets that must be protected.

Since important information can be picked up overtly, the major task of spies is simply to confirm or supplement what was openly obtained.

Few spies are caught, and fewer are ever prosecuted. Only 48 espionage cases have been prosecuted here since World War II, 37 involving North Koreans, 6 involving Russians, and 2 Chinese.

A few—charged with spying against the U.S. security forces—were prosecuted under criminal law. But an assistant military attaché at the Soviet Embassy who collected information on U.S. aircraft and weapons was permitted to go back to Moscow. So was a Soviet news-agency correspondent who tried to get military secrets from a U.S. seaman.

OTTAWA

Canada recently expelled four Cubans for "subversive activities" and brought a Canadian to trial on charges of unlawfully possessing secrets of the North American Air Defense system.

But the shift in spying here, as in many other countries, is away from military intelligence, toward gathering technological and economic information.

"People tend to think of a spy as a guy running around snapping photographs through a fence," says a Canadian official. "This stereotype is less and less what we are up against."

In an open society such as Canada's, there is limited need for traditional cloak-and-dagger activities.



Swiss General Jeanmaire admitted he passed secret documents to the Russians.